

with the Library in developing this legislation. Please let me know if Congressional staff would like to visit the Library's sound recording program to see what we do currently and how your legislation might be implemented.

Sincerely,

JAMES H. BILLINGTON,
The Librarian of Congress.

TEAR DOWN THE WALL OF MILK MARKETING NONSENSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. GUTKNECHT) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Madam Speaker, every morning back in Minnesota, on about 8,300 farms, the lights go on between 4:30 and 5 o'clock in the morning. On those 8,300 dairy farms, people get up; the farmers get up to go out and milk their cows. Now, if there was a group of people in America that works harder than our dairy farmers, I do not know who they are.

Ever since 1937, the dairy farmers in the Upper Midwest have labored under the yoke of the milk marketing order system. It is a convoluted, complicated, and unfair system whereby the price that the dairy farmers receive for their milk is priced based on how far they are away from Eau Claire, Wisconsin. It makes absolutely no economic sense. Now, it may have made sense back in 1937 before the refrigeration we have today, before the interstate highway system that we have today; but it makes no sense today.

In fact, Justice Scalia described the system as Byzantine. Ever since about 1938, those of us who represented the good dairy farmers in the Upper Midwest have been trying to get this system reformed. We have asked for just a modest amount of reform.

Finally, in the last farm bill, we made an agreement that we would request that the Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Glickman, would come back with a proposal to level the playing field at least a little bit in this milk marketing order system so that dairy farmers in the Upper Midwest would not be punished as much just because their dairy farms are located closer to Eau Claire, Wisconsin, than dairy farms in other parts of the country.

Finally, the Secretary of Agriculture came back with a plan, a modest plan. It was not strong enough for many of us. We wanted more reform than the Secretary brought forward. But in the sense of compromise, we were willing to live with that. But, unfortunately, some of our colleagues from the rest of the parts of the country said no, no, no, we cannot even have that modest amount of reform.

Well, Madam Speaker, I want to share with my colleagues some excerpts of an article that was written back in about 1985 about a U.S. Rep-

resentative from the State of Texas who was a former economics professor. He is the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ARMEY). The title of the article is "Moscow on the Mississippi; America's Soviet-style Farm Policy." Let me just read some excerpts from this article.

He starts off by saying, "Even as perestroika comes to the Communist world, our own Federal farm programs remain as American monuments to the folly of central planning. If we have reached the end of history with the vindication of free economy, the USDA has not yet heard the word."

"Fifty years ago, when the Roosevelt administration announced certain 'temporary emergency measures,' farm programs were highly controversial." Even Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture "who conceived the idea, remarked, 'I hope we shall never have to resort to it again.' The USDA has been resorting to it ever since."

"Under the current farm law passed in 1985," and this was in 1986, I believe, the article was written, passed in 1985, "the Department of Agriculture has paid dairy farmers to kill 1.6 million cows."

I go on. He says, "Under the dairy program, local dairy cooperatives are allowed to form government-protected monopolies. Because there is no competition, people have no choice but to buy the milk at higher prices, which is a good arrangement for the big cooperatives, but a bad arrangement for parents who buy milk for their children. The resulting dairy surpluses have been reduced by government's paying dairy farmers" large amounts "to slaughter or export their cows and leave dairy farming for" at least "5 years."

"Like any central planning effort, whether in the Soviet Union or the American Corn Belt, all supply-control policies are riddled with irrationalities and unintended consequences. Even though the USDA has one bureaucrat for every six full-time farmers, fine-tuning the farm economy is a difficult task."

I go on and I quote from the end of this column where he says, "Repeal all marketing orders. Current law prohibits the Office of Management and Budget from even studying them. Marketing orders should be repealed."

"Terminate the dairy program."

Well, Madam Speaker, I say to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ARMEY) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HASTERT), a wall of protectionism cannot stand against free markets. Milk marketing orders cannot be explained, let alone defended. Compacts are trade barriers. Trade barriers are walls.

I say to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. ARMEY) and the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. HASTERT), if they mean what they say about perestroika and open markets, then come here to the well of this House and stop the milk

marketing nonsense. Tear down this wall.

COMMEMORATION OF THE 66TH OBSERVANCE OF UKRAINIAN FAMINE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Ms. KAPTUR) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. KAPTUR. Madam Speaker, as a cochair of the Congressional Ukrainian Caucus, I rise to commemorate the 66th observance of the Ukrainian Famine, to help record this century's largely untold story of famine and repression in the former Soviet Union.

During 1932 and 1933, the people of Ukraine were devastated by hunger, though not the kind caused by unfavorable natural conditions. Instead, only certain regions or a part of the country suffered famine while the government of the former Soviet Union turned their backs upon the population.

The famine of 1932 and 1933 stemmed from political rather than natural causes. In 1932, Ukraine had an average grain harvest of 146,600,000 metric tons of wheat, and there was no danger of famine, or at least there should not have been.

But the famine was first and foremost a planned repression of the peasants by the Soviet government for their resistance to collective savings. Second, it was an intentional attack on Ukrainian village life, which was the bulwark of Ukrainian heritage. Third, it was the result of the forced export of grain in exchange for imported machinery which was required for the implementation of the policy of industrialization.

The events of 1932 and 1933 are considered a man-made famine because food was available. But what happened was politically motivated. It characterized the Soviet system and ultimately resulted in the deaths of over 6 million people, including our great grandparents.

□ 2000

People died by the millions, and they were piled at the village edge like cord wood. According to Stalin's commands and the law that was enacted in 1932, Party activists confiscated grain from peasant households. Any man, woman, or child either could be, and often was, executed for taking a handful of grain from a collective farm field or was punished by 10 years of hard labor.

Gangs of Communist Party activists conducted house-to-house searches, tearing up floors and delving into wells in search of grain. Those who were already swollen from malnutrition were not allowed to keep their grain, and those who were not starving were suspected of hoarding food. An average peasant family of five had about five pounds of grain a month to last until the next harvest.